In summary

Momentum exists for greater inclusion of women in Defence Forces across the globe and for greater recognition of diversity, but progress is yet to be fully evaluated. There is a striking similarity in the themes and recommendations emanating from the different militaries examined, including a focus on:

- promoting a broad understanding of diversity as an operational imperative and core defence value
- securing strong and unequivocal commitment from defence leadership, as well as from middle management
- increasing the number of women and other under-represented groups within senior ranks
- increasing the number of women, not just as an overall figure across the Services, but in specific occupational areas and units
- ensuring that women are not assigned to posts on their own or in small numbers but as part of a larger cohort
- broadening the occupational opportunities available to women, including through the opening of combat roles
- recognising the importance of retention through the use of family friendly policies and career support mechanisms such as mentoring and sponsorship
- recognising the specific needs of women in the field (for example, health care, appropriate uniforms)
- addressing gender-based harassment and violence
- providing effective training and supportive responses
- conducting ongoing assessment and monitoring to evaluate progress
- avoiding one-size-fits-all approaches, particularly in contexts that have already achieved a significant representation of women
- ensuring adequate resourcing to drive cultural change.

The Review’s examination of comparable international militaries reveals a continuing echo of the themes and challenges currently faced by the ADF, in turn confirming the Review’s findings that certain broad principles need to be observed in order to achieve meaningful change. The ADF is not alone in requiring change, with many militaries around the world attempting to increase women’s representation and progression to senior ranks. This Chapter identifies trends and lessons from international Services that may assist the ADF as it works towards being a first class employer for both male and female personnel.

Certainly, the ADF is itself recognised internationally as having taken the lead on many relevant practices – an increased emphasis on employee work-life balance and consolidation of equity programs being just two examples. Nevertheless, challenges continue to exist in realising the ADF’s potential as a first class employer in this regard, with similar obstacles facing Defence Services around the globe. Like the ADF, international Defence Forces have grappled with the formal integration of women into their ranks, some more successfully than others. Most have made parallel strides and faced similar setbacks as they recognise that establishing formal equality of opportunity does not necessarily lead to equality of outcomes.

The Review has focussed its examination on those Services which bear most cultural and historical similarity to the ADF, such as the United States Armed Forces, the UK Armed Forces, the Canadian Forces (CF) and New Zealand Defence Forces (NZDF); as well as on the Defence Forces of the Netherlands, Norway and, to a lesser extent Sweden, as examples of nations that have made particularly strong commitments to the participation of women in both civilian and defence environments.

While this Chapter does not attempt an exhaustive analysis, it touches briefly on some of the common challenges facing these defence forces, before moving to a discussion of possible solutions.
9.1 An elusive critical mass

The absence of a critical mass of women in any defence arena remains, in itself, a significant impediment to career progression. A variety of evidence exists to support the idea that women act more distinctively once their numbers reach a given threshold.\(^2\) Certainly, literature examined by the Review suggests that the greater the presence of women as Defence personnel – both in terms of the breadth of the roles they occupy, as well as their presence in leadership positions – the more likely their acceptance by male colleagues.

Equally, literature suggests that the smaller the representation of women in any particular Service, occupation or unit, the more reluctant other women will be to join. This is not simply for reasons of camaraderie, but because female personnel do not want to attract attention as the ‘token’ woman nor function under the heightened scrutiny that seems to accompany this novelty status.

As one study in the US context confirmed, the lack of a significant number means that an ‘average’ or more generalised view of women is unachievable. Women therefore tend to be perceived in terms of the performance of the small number present – judged by the conduct of their only other female colleague, or pitted in opposition to them. In other words, ‘one woman sets the reputation for all…’\(^3\)

Further, without identifiable female role models, women question their potential to reach senior positions and therefore the value of investing in a defence career. This means that the absence of women can be self-perpetuating, as can their presence. Certainly, the Review’s discussions with US defence representatives confirm this – the absence of women in senior ranks of less traditional occupations such as mine clearance diving for example, slows the assignment of further numbers of women into these units.\(^4\)

All of the Services examined had put efforts into increasing the number of women within their ranks. While figures tend to vary depending on what elements of each Service are included, currently the Canadian Forces (CF) are nominated throughout international literature as a benchmark, with an overall representation of women totalling around 15.1%.\(^5\) CF representatives told the Review, however, that numbers are stagnating, with the CF putting a new emphasis on recruiting.\(^6\) The NZDF, albeit a smaller force, has a representation of 16.3%.\(^7\) Similarly, women comprise around 14.5% of total US forces\(^8\) while, in contrast, the UK, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden remain at single digit percentages.\(^9\) As the Review has found, though, total representation is not always an indication of overall commitment to women’s inclusion, nor of the opportunities available to women once they arrive.

9.2 Limited opportunities – occupational segregation

While the overall number of women personnel in the defence forces examined remains below that which is necessary to achieve meaningful change, the Review’s examination also confirmed that, like the ADF, these forces still struggle to secure women’s participation across the full breadth of Service occupations.

Historically, of course, male and female personnel were officially segregated into different defence occupations – the role of Oceanographic Operator, for example, specifically being an all-female occupation in the CF until 1985 because women were seen to have greater manual dexterity and ability to pay attention to detail.\(^10\)

As novel as this may now seem, occupational segregation still manifests in each Force examined and in different proportional representations across each arm of Service. For example, while the Army almost invariably has the lowest number of women in each national Force, women were present in the highest numbers in the Navy in New Zealand and the Netherlands on the one hand\(^11\) but in the Air Force in Canada and the UK and US on the other.\(^12\) Arguably, the greater representation in the Air Forces of the larger defence
powers is partially due to the fact that Air Force personnel are less likely to be exposed to ground close combat, or perhaps the result of the Air Force’s more recent emergence as an operational wing.

In addition to the variation across the Services, women remain overrepresented in particular fields within each branch – medical, administrative and support roles dominating the areas in which women are most commonly employed. As an example, figures from Canada indicate that, despite the CF’s relative success in gender integration, as at 2007, around 80% of those employed in dental health roles were women; while women represented less than 4% of personnel in naval maintenance, electrical, mechanical and engineering trades and only 1.3% of those employed in the combat arms.\textsuperscript{13}

Similarly, figures from the Netherlands confirm a disproportionate number of women in medical service, administration, logistics and communications, with few in combat, technical, or maintenance roles. This varied from Service to Service, with women seldom working in technical classifications in the Navy and Air Force, but better represented in combat units, with 33% of those in the Navy and 19% in the Air Force being in combat roles although, as pilots they tended to fly helicopters, rather than fighter jets.\textsuperscript{14}

In the US, active-duty women are much more heavily concentrated in administrative and medical roles than active-duty men, with administrative positions the leading occupation for women in the Marine Corps and the second highest in the US Air Force behind health care.\textsuperscript{15}

Meanwhile, in the UK Armed Forces, where around only 70% of occupations in the Royal Navy and Army, and 96% of posts in the Royal Air Force are open to women, support roles also dominate. It is interesting to note, however, that there was a greater percentage of women in the warfare and logistics branches in the Royal Navy than in the medical branch as at 2006, although it seems over half of these remained shore-based and further breakdown was not located.\textsuperscript{16}

Regardless of the international context, it is clear that attitudinal barriers and expectations – both from women themselves and from others – continue to propel the majority of female defence personnel along particular career paths. While this is a cultural phenomenon that is difficult to overcome with formal policy, as shown in Appendix P, international forces are attempting to redress the underrepresentation in particular areas of Service through specific recruitment and awareness campaigns.

This is certainly an imperative, as studies of women’s progression through defence ranks suggest that diverse occupational experience is a significant factor in promotion opportunities, increasing their experience and, in turn, their authority and acceptance as leaders.\textsuperscript{17}

### 9.3 Combat exclusion

While the concentration of women in traditional occupations may be an example of informal – or circumstantial – segregation, the continuing exclusion of women from ground close combat roles by some Defence Services remains an official form of segregation.

As discussed in section 5.3, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway and New Zealand have all officially removed restrictions on women’s participation in combat roles, albeit with some initial qualifications.\textsuperscript{18} The US continues to exclude women ‘from assignments to units and positions below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground’,\textsuperscript{19} other than, more recently, assignments to support roles in those contexts. Similarly, the UK excludes women from roles whose primary duty is ‘to close with and kill the enemy’, such as infantry and artillery.\textsuperscript{20}

Also as discussed in section 5.3, the ADF is moving towards the integration of women in all Service roles. In fact, the ADF has been recognised as a possible model for international forces to study when contemplating moving to full integration.\textsuperscript{21}
For the purposes of this Chapter, though, the ADF’s decision can be reinforced by noting the widespread acknowledgment of the role that active combat experience plays in career progression in defence cultures.22 This is in part because combat experience is regarded as a strong indicator of leadership skill and ability. In many cases, it is part of the job description or required skill base and has been widely acknowledged as the most significant contributing factor to promotion opportunities.23 Less tangibly, combat experience is also a way for personnel to prove themselves as ‘real’ soldiers and gain the respect and regard of their peers, in turn cementing their authority as leaders.24

It is also worth briefly examining the increasing confusion that surrounds this issue in contexts such as the US. It is interesting to note, for example, that palpable differences have existed between the relevant US Army and Department of Defense policies that enforce the exclusion, leaving room for some inconsistent application,25 while the changing nature of combat means that it is more and more difficult to identify and segregate the ‘front line’. This difficulty of segregating the ‘front line’ has been articulated by Admiral Mike Mullen in the United States as:

In a war where there is no longer a clear delineation between frontlines and sidelines, where the war can come at you from any direction, [we have] large numbers of women…exposed to some form of combat.26

Accordingly, despite being officially restricted from being formally ‘assigned’ to combat units, women have been nevertheless ‘attached’ to many combat units – often receiving the same combat, weapons and counter-insurgency training and being exposed to the same risks.27 In fact, in 2010, over 40% of women veterans reported that they had been exposed to hostile action.28 Similarly, many US Servicewomen have died in the US’s most recent deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan and, despite being legally excluded from combat, two have been awarded the Silver Star for valour in combat.29

Slightly differently, in 2003, the US Army established all-female ‘Lioness’ teams to follow all-male Marine combat units on what has been described to the Review as ‘stability operations’.30 Designed as a ‘calming’ presence to engage with the local female population and, where necessary, to search Iraqi women for weapons or explosives, they are nevertheless exposed to risk. Similarly, as in the ADF, Female Engagement Teams (FETs) continue to accompany infantry units and Marine manoeuvre units in Afghanistan and, as of November 2009, all international and Afghan security forces were directed to establish FETs of their own. Meanwhile, in 2010, the first class of 24 women officers began to be integrated to assignment on guided-missile attack and ballistic-missile submarines – exposing them to forward deployed strike and strategic deterrent operational experience.31

As one commentator has noted, ‘the reality on the ground has outpaced the debate’,32 with critics suggesting that bureaucratic sidesteps are depriving women of professional recognition and post deployment support.33

More generally, longstanding calls for the removal of the last combat restrictions, including by the congressionally mandated Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC), are supported by a growing body of qualitative and quantitative research. This research suggests that such a step would neither disrupt unit cohesion nor pose a particular risk specific to women. Rather, it is critical to operational effectiveness, especially if talented women are to be recruited and retained in service.34

Despite this, and following extended consideration within the Pentagon, a decision was announced in February 2012 to officially open support roles in combat units to women, with a promise to ‘continue to open as many positions as possible to women’.35 It is estimated that this will open over 14,000 active-duty and reserve jobs previously off-limits, including combat medic, artillery mechanic, communications expert and other posts that support, rather than directly engage in fire fight.36 Infantry and special forces roles will remain closed, however, with progress on implementation of the changes to be reviewed in six months.37 All Services are engaged in the implementation of this decision, albeit with varying approaches, and are also researching how further reform might be achieved.38
9.4 Lack of women in leadership

Though indisputably important, a lack of combat experience is just one of a range of obstacles to women’s career progression. Certainly, no Service examined had a proportional representation of women at star rank officer level. In NZ or the UK, for example, the highest ranking female officer in the Army being a Brigadier while only two women held 2 star rank or above in the Netherlands at 2007.

As at 2005 only 6% of those US Officers ranked at Major General (2 star) and 3.3% of those at Brigadier General level (1 star) were women. In 2008, General Ann E. Dunwoody became the first appointed to 4 star General, while Lt. Gen Janet Wolfenbarger recently became the first woman promoted to four star general in the US Air Force. In the CF, as at 2009, women represented 3% of general officers in the Army and 8% in the Air Force, with none at similar rank in the Navy.

As well as an indication that talented women are not progressing through the ranks, a shortage of women in leadership deprives other female personnel of the example and potential mentoring from which they might benefit.

For the women who do reach leadership level, one of the challenges they face is continuing isolation in operational environments – addressing the same issues over and over, and pioneering every time they move into a new context in which they are, yet again, the first. Further, the attention they attract also impacts those they lead, compounding the significance of a woman at the helm.

Of particular interest, statistics regarding women in leadership can be misleading. For example, as at 2010, 17% of women in the US Services were officers, compared with 15% of men. Yet the small number of women personnel overall mean that just one individual can distort the percentage. One such study cites an example in which three Marine Corps women were eligible for promotion and, with one selected, the promotion rate became 33%.

In addition, the US Air Force also has a comparatively large representation of women at officer level. Yet the tendency of women to gravitate towards professional roles in the medical, legal and chaplaincy corps can skew the picture, meaning that, in some cases, apparent improvements are masking a professional form of occupational segregation. Clearly, a more meaningful statistic would be that 17% of officers in the US Armed Forces are women, rather than the other way around.

Common to all Services examined by the Review was a decline in the number of women personnel beyond the levels of ‘middle management’, or at around the five to ten year Service mark. The CF, for example, has experienced a significant number of women leaving at this point, the biggest reason nominated being the conflict of Service with their family plans or obligations. Similarly, the Netherlands has identified that retention of women is certainly as important a goal as recruitment; with one Dutch commentator suggesting lateral re-entry/horizontal intake as a strategy to overcome attrition.

The studies referred to above suggest that the women who remain in Service past the usual attrition point do have similar opportunities for promotion as men. Forces committed to promoting talented women, then, should promote measures that support women to stay in Service. Obvious examples are family friendly work practices and reasonable parental leave policies. Limited provisions in some Services, however, as well as lengthy deployments away from home, make it difficult for female personnel to continue in service, especially if they are single parents, as many are.

For example, the US Department of Defence generally gives new mothers only six weeks of maternity leave before they must return to some form of work or training. Each Service branch then has its own post-birth deferment from deployment policy, the Army generally giving women only four months to stay home with their infants before deploying them on tours of duty which currently average 15 months. In a slight improvement, the Marines offer 6 month deferments and their tours average 7 months; while the Navy has moved to
12 month deferment with deployments usually a maximum of 6 months, if not less. The Review understands that the Pentagon is currently examining this disparity and, certainly, the Review's discussions with US defence representatives confirm that other Services are observing the Navy's extended deferment with interest.

Finally, in addition to problems in retaining women, much of the literature examined by the Review suggests a lag in attitudes about women's leadership abilities that has not kept pace with their ascension to senior positions. As in the civilian context, and as in the ADF, many Servicewomen feel compelled to perform at a higher standard than men, simply to gain the same recognition.

Interestingly, studies also note that Defence Forces are increasingly looking for 'transformational' leadership qualities traditionally associated with women, such as collaboration, mentoring and building cohesive organisations. This implies that the needs of Defence Forces are outpacing their traditional culture and systems.

### 9.5 Hyper-masculine culture

A wide body of research describes the military environment as one which not only encourages masculine traits in individuals, but which celebrates masculine values within a static organisational structure. Such culture, across many contexts, is generally referred to as a hyper-masculine culture.

This controlling and homogenous culture is one which, by its very nature, discourages difference. On occasion, it reveals itself in extreme and shocking behaviours. Too often, it is also displayed in gender-based violence and harassment, as will be discussed in the next section – a behaviour used as much to keep women in their place and to bond with male colleagues over exploits, as it is for sexual gratification.

Most commonly, perhaps, this culture manifests in generalised resistance to women's integration – treating it as something imposed from without, rather than embraced from within. This can range from palpable hostility, to stereotyping women along sexual lines (promiscuous, lesbian, or asexual) through to treating women as completely invisible. International literature extensively explores the less measurable aspects of this hostility – aspects that will only adapt as a result of internal cultural change. There is also value, however, in examining some of the more tangible examples of the way in which women's invisibility manifests.

One such example is the failure to provide women with appropriate uniforms, accommodation or health care, one report observing that active duty women receive limited access to routine health care or appropriate supplies via the US defence health care system, TRICARE. While a full range of services are theoretically on offer, services struggle to deliver in the field, leaving female personnel with inadequate access to gender-specific products and prescriptions, and women reluctant to disclose concerns to male command, or to admit to injury which may be perceived as weakness.

Equally, upon returning home, women veterans have often been met with inadequate facilities or care. The US Veterans Affairs infrastructure, for example, has been, until recently, unfamiliar with health problems specific to women, such as damage to reproductive systems from chemical exposure. More generally, women veterans appear to be especially at risk of persistent disadvantage, such as unemployment, homelessness and mental health problems.

In particular, many female veterans experience a range of serious health problems as a consequence of Military Sexual Trauma (MST). In fact, in financial year 2011, 19.4% of Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation New Dawn female Veterans reported a history of MST when screened by a Veterans Affairs (VA) healthcare provider, compared with 0.9 % of equivalent male Veterans. Rates of MST reported among all Veterans screened by the VA were 23.0% for females and 1.2% for males.

Problems associated with MST were described to the Review as ranging from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), through to migraines, stomach disorders, chronic fatigue, fibromyalgia and gynaecological problems.
This means that access to appropriate and anonymous support is identified as an ongoing concern, with the US Department of Veterans Affairs recently establishing a Taskforce to bring about cultural change in the way health services and benefits are delivered to women veterans. This is particularly important given that women are the largest growing demographic of US veterans, with their number projected to increase from 1.8 million in 2011 to 2 million in 2020, at which point women will make up 10.7 per cent of the total veteran population.

Equally concerning are reports that after disclosing that they have been the victim of a sexual assault, women veterans have been incorrectly diagnosed with personality disorders and then involuntarily discharged from service. The Review was advised that the US Service branches are beginning to examine this worrying trend.

Meanwhile, the 2010 Report of the Defence Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) relates examples of female personnel continuing to receive inadequate uniforms and equipment whilst on operations. DACOWITS focus group members reported receiving ill-fitting, oversized uniforms that impeded their ability to do their jobs; being issued inadequate vests that had been rejected by other Service branches; or being issued jackets with insufficient plates, leaving female soldiers to divide and distribute them between them depending upon the direction of enemy fire.

In an extension of this, the Review was advised that women are experiencing specific health problems as an indirect result of their uniform’s limitations – contracting urinary tract infections in the field, for example, because they are unable to stop and urinate quickly in the way that their male colleagues can. The Review was also told that women’s shorter stature can mean that, on long marches, their rucksacks repeatedly hit them in the sciatic nerve, causing long term chronic pain. This represents a blunt illustration of a culture that continues to be designed for men.

9.6 Gender-based violence and harassment

Perhaps the most palpable manifestation of the defence masculine culture is the scale of gender-based violence against women within Defence Services worldwide. From the extraordinary rates of sexual assault reported during US deployments, through to escalated rates of sexual harassment in the Swedish Armed Forces when compared to the civilian environment, these forms of hostility towards women act as a significant impediment to women’s increased representation, retention and progression through the Services.

Most specifically in the US, reports suggest that over 52 sexual assaults occur each day in the Service, with 85% going unreported and commanders sending fewer than one in four reported cases to trial. One commentator reports that US female Service personnel deployed in Iraq were more likely to be raped by a fellow soldier than be injured by enemy fire, a form of betrayal within the military family suggested to the Review as being akin to incest. Meanwhile, the Review’s investigations reveal a tendency to disbelieve women’s claims.

Certainly, this is not a recent phenomenon, nor confined to the US. In 1998, the military magazine Maclean’s reported that Canada’s military police had investigated 145 sexual assaults by members of the CF in 1997 alone, a large number given the relative size of the Canadian Services. In a developing scandal, the investigation revealed a pattern of sexual offending and subsequent systemic failure that mirrored those identified elsewhere, including in Australia and the US. These patterns included the reluctance of women to come forward and report, the common experience of not being believed, a failure to respond by the chain of command, disciplinary action for related but trivial matters against the victims, rather than the perpetrators, and consequent disillusionment with the military as a whole on the part of the complainants.

All Services examined reported similar problems, albeit on much smaller scales than the US. Equally, and as will be discussed, all Forces examined were making significant efforts to address this, identifying sexual assault and any form of harassment as damaging to unit cohesion and combat effectiveness.
Certainly, the US has made the most significant efforts of all Forces examined, as a result of the scale mentioned above.

Establishing the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) in 2005 as a single point of contact for sexual assault policy, the Department of Defense has invested real resources in training, response, reporting and accountability, and increased support for victims. One million personnel have been trained as first responders, including specially appointed Sexual Assault Response Co-ordinators, with sexual assault program offices established at every major defence installation.82

The appointment of a two star general to lead SAPRO was met with approval and there has been a significant increase in rates of reporting of sexual assault which SAPRO claims, quite reasonably, is an indication of growing confidence in the system.83 Still, one media report claims that in 2010, fewer than 21% of reported cases went to trial, with commanding officers deciding not to prosecute, or impose non-judicial or administrative punishment and, certainly, there is considerable commentary on the inadequacy of the military legal system’s response to rape.84 Encouragingly, reforms were recently announced to provide greater resources to each Service branch for victims support and the investigation of offences; as well as to elevate disposition of sexual assault allegations to the rank of Colonel (Navy Captain) in recognition of their severity, an announcement that has been met with approval from US advocacy groups.85

In addition, the 2011 DACOWITS Report highlighted the need to improve confidence in the system, noting a lack of follow-up on reported sexual assaults and any consequent disciplinary action that makes it difficult for personnel to know whether sexual assaults are taken seriously, whether an individual’s rank affects the outcome, or whether perpetrators are held to account.86

While significant efforts have been invested in acknowledging and addressing the extent of sexual assault in international Defence Services, reform of the magnitude that is needed takes time to achieve real results.

9.7 Broad Observations – from Integration to Inclusion

The barriers facing women in Defence Services around the globe are certainly numerous, and well documented in the literature examined by the Review. The Review’s objective is to identify trends and initiatives which seek to overcome these barriers and in order to do this, it is useful first to make some broad observations about the contexts in which they are likely to develop.

The first is that, while increasing the representation of women in Defence is a vital first step, overall numbers in respective Defence Forces do not necessarily reflect a wider political commitment to women’s participation. Nor do they reflect the opportunities available for women within each Service to rise to leadership positions. As this Chapter identifies, nations with an overt political commitment to the recruitment of women to all aspects of Service, such as the Netherlands and Norway, nevertheless struggle to recruit and retain a critical mass of female personnel.87 For example, Norway was the first NATO state to open all combat positions, including submarine service, in 1985. Yet no woman had served as a marine commando or fighter pilot 15 years later.88

The United States, with its continued (albeit qualified) restrictions on assignments, has a higher proportional representations of women across the Services, as observed above. Again, international literature nominates Canada as a benchmark in terms of a high representation of women and the highest number of women at senior levels.89
The Review notes that the nature of the overall mission seems, to a significant degree, to impact on the opportunities made formally available to women. As an example, the New Zealand Defence Force, whose international mission is concerned mainly with peacekeeping operations and crisis response – yet holds a fairly marginal role in national civic life – has a comparatively high overall representation of women.

The background against which initiatives have been developed, and the specific events which have preceded them, can influence the focus of policy. As noted earlier, the sheer size of the US Defence Forces, as well as a series of sexual assault scandals, have seen US efforts largely invested in responding to these, as well as to the highly charged debate over opening remaining combat roles to women.

Having grappled with its own scandals in the 1990s, the CF has arguably been able to proceed further down the road in terms of taking a proactive approach to gender integration. This stands in contrast to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), which is currently the subject of a class action launched by over 100 former female personnel who claim a longstanding culture of harassment and discrimination. Within the RCMP, a hotline has been established and a review is underway by the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP regarding the manner in which harassment complaints have been addressed. It seems that the RCMP is only now beginning to confront behaviours that were acknowledged by the CF decades ago.

The Defence Services examined face similar opportunities and challenges within the broader economic and military context. All are competing with civilian employers in buoyant labour markets to attract and retain members – recognising that, in what has been described as the ‘war for talent’ they need to provide the kind of conditions and career opportunities that can rival civilian industry. Services are also recognising that over half their best recruits or graduates are either women or from minority groups – a talent pool which any defence force seeking full capability cannot afford to ignore. In short, Services are recognising that they also need to be employers of choice to be combat effective.

In doing so, Forces are moving to a different, and perhaps more promising, phase in the inclusion of women – away from their initial, ‘gender-neutral’ approach that complied with external or legislative requirement. The assumption behind this approach was that the door should simply be opened to women, assimilating them into the military norm without any change to custom and practice – a “just add women and stir” approach. This left differences ignored and the overarching culture intact.

As the most successful employers have progressively discovered – and as this Report explores – individual differences can be an organisational strength. Harnessing this strength requires unequivocal commitment from an organisation’s leadership – both in terms of strong statements and policies; as well as adequate support and resources. It also requires an understanding that change will take time – particularly in the defence context, in which leaders are ‘grown’, rather than hired on lateral intake. This means establishing policies that prevent and respond to violence, for example, as well as other forms of hostility towards personnel who do not fit the traditional mould. It means establishing policies which maximise retention and acknowledge that the profile of defence personnel has shifted significantly in recent generations – a profile which should reflect the face of the nation it serves. It means looking to the civilian sector for examples of policies which encourage retention and loyalty.

As such, international Services are recognising the benefits of improving the defence experience for all members – moving from policy that approaches the integration of women as a problem to be addressed, to a focus on the value of diversity and individual talents in all their forms. As mentioned earlier in this Report, a representative of the CF told the Review:

Integration is not about women, it’s about the team….about building everyone’s self-confidence.

All Services are at a reasonably early stage in this recognition, meaning that, in many cases, progress is yet to be evaluated.

What follows is a sample of the ways in which the forces examined are approaching this next step towards genuine gender integration.
9.8 Principles and Lessons Learned

The following section details principles and lessons learned from the international evidence examined by the Review. The principles identified contribute to the framework for the Review’s recommendations. More detail and examples of promising practices from international militaries are provided at Appendix P.

(a) Principle 1: Strong leadership drives reform

Strong statements and examples set by leadership have been identified as being the biggest factor in the success of gender integration or inclusion.99 Certainly, the congressionally mandated Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC), which handed down its findings in 2010, noted that personal commitment from leaders trained in the value of diversity is essential to women ascending to senior positions – the consequences of such commitment being observed by the Review’s discussions with the US Navy in particular.100 Similarly, as discussed earlier in the Report, the Review was advised by representatives of the CF that, when first trialling the integration of women into combat units, ‘buy-in’ from leadership was the most significant factor in the initiative’s success, regardless of the number of women placed in each unit.101

All Services examined had a range of strong policies, endorsed by leadership, that address issues such as sexual assault and harassment, dispute resolution, career progression and strategies for retention. Similarly, unequivocal statements of the value of diversity were present in all Services examined, albeit with varying emphases,102 a sample of which is nominated in Appendix P.

These policies reflect an increasing realisation that a one-size fits all approach does not always garner positive results. While ‘special treatment’ can sometimes be counter-productive, an entirely gender-neutral approach that ignores difference altogether is just as destructive – especially when juxtaposed upon a masculine culture that, in every other way, singles out female personnel as ‘token’ or ‘other’. In short, defence forces are realising that gender blind ‘integration’ does not make women feel included – just invisible.

Responding to this requires unequivocal commitment from an organisation’s leadership – both in terms of strong statements and policies, as well as adequate support and resources. This means embedding the value of diversity and equity across the full of breadth of the Services through regular training and education. It means policies that prevent and respond to sexual violence, bullying and harassment, as well as to other forms of hostility towards women. It includes examining those policies that demonstrate a complete disregard of personnel who do not fit the traditional defence mould. It also means adequate investment of resources and supports; as well as regular evaluation.103

Along these lines, the most successful approach appears to be one in which difference is acknowledged and addressed through mainstreamed training and education, rather than being treated as an optional extra. Additionally, successful approaches include pragmatic recognition of difference and can be as fundamental as ensuring appropriate facilities and uniforms,104 appropriate health support and information (regarding birth control, for example); as well as examining whether the physical standards set for the full range of occupations do, in fact, reflect the realistic requirements of the task.

Defence Force efforts to create truly inclusive Services have been rewarded with recognition by various civilian sectors. Such acknowledgement has been publicised with pride by the Services themselves.

(b) Principle 2: Diversity of leadership increases capability

Just as important as strong leadership on the imperative of inclusion and diversity, is a truly diverse leadership that better reflects the membership of the Services. As explored throughout this Report, factors which prevent women from assuming leadership positions, include their limited exposure to opportunities which broaden their experience, practical and structural barriers to their remaining in Service as well as, less tangibly, perceptions about their ability to lead.105
In recognition of these impediments, the Committee for Women in NATO Forces (CWINF) has made certain specific recommendations that member states reserve available positions for qualified women, pay special consideration to women as a target group and establish a moderate quota system which gives priority to the under-represented gender.\textsuperscript{106}

(c) Principle 3: Increasing numbers requires increasing opportunities

In addition to its recommendations regarding commitment from leadership, the MLDC recommended the creation of a 20-30 year workforce pipeline. In order to do so, of course, Services need to commit to improving recruitment and retention. Certainly, the CWINF recommendations referred to earlier promote active recruitment of women to defence environments, with initiatives that include the regulation of physical fitness tests for women, information campaigns that specify military career options for women, inviting all eligible women to an information day in a letter outlining the value of military service, and ensuring an equal number of women and men in recruitment and selection boards.

Equally important, the CWINF recommends the implementation of guarantees that female personnel will not be assigned to all-male groups and that junior female personnel are assigned to groups with senior female personnel. Understanding what drives women to join and remain in Defence Service is also a crucial first step.

(d) Principle 4: Greater flexibility will strengthen the ADF

No matter what the occupation, the representation of women is only likely to increase if women are retained, as well as recruited, in Defence. As the CWINF and the MLDC have observed, where women stay in Defence Service longer, they are more likely to rise to positions of leadership. In turn, where more women occupy positions of leadership, others are more likely to follow.\textsuperscript{107}

As observed earlier, all forces examined were experiencing a higher rate of attrition in female personnel than male personnel – in general at about the time at which women are customarily juggling their parenting and professional lives.\textsuperscript{108} This means that workforce practices that respond to this through increased flexibility are essential to retention. Further, in the US context, a study notes that a greater proportion of active-duty women are likely to be married to fellow defence personnel if they are married; or more likely to be single parents than their male counterparts, making flexibility even more important.\textsuperscript{109}

As discussed earlier in this Report, the CF has identified that each Service member retained equals ten new personnel recruited in terms of value to the force, also recognising that employees’ personal lives are the strongest motivation for employees to stay.\textsuperscript{110} Accordingly, policies which make the experience of serving in the Defence Forces more compatible with these outside obligations and interests can contribute to retention of all personnel, and therefore a stronger Defence Force.

(e) Principle 5: Gender based harassment and violence ruins lives, divides teams and damages operational effectiveness

The Review examined initiatives combating gender-based violence and harassment in international defence forces. While all had very clear and robust anti-harassment policies, as well as comprehensive sexual assault response mechanisms, the standout example is the US DOD’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) and supporting initiatives. Detail is provided in Appendix P and informs some of the Review’s recommendations in this area.
9.9 Conclusion

Given the universality of these themes, it is clear that the direction has been set towards greater diversity at the higher levels of integrated Defence Forces. The question remains whether this will translate to and enhance the experience of female personnel on the ground.

An answer may lie in a study of the views of CF female personnel on the strategies of superiors which, in their opinion, aided gender integration in the operational field. Practices nominated by these personnel bear a strong resemblance to those identified above and include:

- setting an example (leadership on diversity)
- inspiring teamwork (transformational and diverse leadership)
- not singling women out (accumulating a critical mass)
- mentoring (retention and career progression)
- dealing with difference ‘without making a big deal’ (gender-inclusive, not gender-blind), and, importantly
- not defining integration as only an issue relating to women (acknowledging the benefits to operational effectiveness).

As the Review was told by a female representative of the CF:

> As stiff and closed as the Army sounds [and] because of our culture, it brings the best and the worst out of people...We have a much better chance of achieving career opportunities for women...than out there in the corporate world.

From operational theatres to Joint Command, the imperatives appear to be the same. It is now for all Defence Forces, including the ADF, to harness this momentum.
because the large aircraft operated out of only two bases, meaning that personnel were more likely to establish stable family
preferring to fly large planes, rather than fighter jets, in part because of an unwelcoming culture in the fighter jet arena, but also
Moelker and Bolsch, note 11, p 27. Of interest, the Review notes advice that women pilots in the US Navy and Air Force were 14
Leadership in the Canadian Forces’, note 10, p 82. The Review was also recently advised that women comprise only 4.2% of
the police force (approximately 40% of the Norwegian police force are women): ‘Request for information, Australian Defence
was advised that, in Norway, women are not particularly attracted to defence roles and potential candidates head instead to
Canadian Forces,13
Women in the Armed Forces,
RAF , 9.3% of the RN and 8.2% of the Army. See UK Ministry of Defence,
note 9.
Women-in-the-u-s-military-growing-share-distinctive-profile/ (viewed 14 January 2012). In the UK women number 12.3% of the
National Report to the Committee for Women in NATO Forces
Army 11%, Navy 13.9%. Canadian Forces,
As at May 2009, the proportion of women’s representation across the Service branches of the CF stood at Air Force 17.5%,
Swedish figures are
generally broken down into conscripts and officers, and therefore tend to vary, but at a representation of 4.6% of both groups,
the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, provided to the Review by CMDR A Westwood, 4 March 2012.
Canadian Forces,
Meeting with Canadian Commanders delegation.
G Scoppio, ‘Diversity Best Practices in Military Organizations in Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States’
25 June 2012). See also MAJ L Bourgon, The CF as an Employer of Choice: The Key for a Successful Gender Integration JCSP
(viewed 4 June 2011).
D Studlar and I McAllister, ‘Does a critical mass exist? A comparative analysis of women’s legislative representation since 1950’
MAJ A Evertson and CAPT A Nesbitt, The Glass Ceiling Effect and its Impact on Mid-Level Female Officer Career Progression
Meeting with Navy Personnel Office of Diversity and Inclusion, USA.
Canadian Forces, National Report to the Committee for Women in NATO Forces (2009), p 2. At http://www.nato.int/issues/
Meeting with Canadian Commanders delegation.
Data current as of 30 September 2010: Women in the Military Service for America Memorial, ‘Statistics on Women in the Military’,
Women represent a total of 9.1% of the UK Armed Forces. See UK Ministry of Defence, Women in the Armed Forces. At www.
mod.uk/DefenceInternet/Factsheets/PersonnelFactsheets/WomenInTheArmedForces.htm (viewed 29 March 2012). In the
Netherlands, the representation of women in the Dutch Defence Force stood at only 9% in 2009, despite a concerted effort to
recruit women: E Jansen and WO=WEN WG 1325, Dutch Gender Platform, UNSCR 1325 In-country monitoring report – The
provided to the Review by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence on 4 March 2012 notes that, as at 2 March 2012, women
represented 8.6% of Norwegian defence personnel, with a goal of 20% by 2020: ‘Request for information, Australian Defence Staff: Recruitment and retention of women in the Norwegian armed forces (NAF) – evaluations and reports’, Response from the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, provided to the Review by CMDR A Westwood, 4 March 2012. Swedish figures are
generally broken down into conscripts and officers, and therefore tend to vary, but at a representation of 4.6% of both groups,
woman account for a very small number of the active duty armed forces in Sweden, as opposed to 40% of civilian defence
personnel. See European Commission, Employment, Social Affairs & Equal Opportunities, EQUAL. Practical examples – Equal
28 March 2012).
As has been observed in other defence contexts, the exclusively female nature of the role led to Oceanographic Operators
developing a reputation as promiscuous on the one hand, or as lesbians on the other: LTCOM K Davis, ‘From Ocean Ops to
Combat Ops: A Short History of Women and Leadership in the Canadian Forces’ in K Davis (ed), Women and Leadership in the
R Moelker and J Bolsch, Hidden Women: Women in the Netherlands Armed Forces, Publications of the Faculty of Military
As at May 2009, the proportion of women’s representation across the Service branches of the CF stood at Air Force 17.5%,
Army 11%, Navy 13.9%. Canadian Forces, National Report to the Committee for Women in NATO Forces (2009), note 5, p 2.
In the US, meanwhile, nearly one third of all women in the US military are in the Air Force (31%), as opposed to only 22% of all
men. Only 7% of military women are Marines, compared with 16% of men. E Patten and K Parker, ‘Women in the US Military:
women-in-the-u-s-military-growing-share-distinctive-profile/ (viewed 14 January 2012). In the UK women number 12.3% of the
RAF; 9.3% of the RN and 8.2% of the Army. See UK Ministry of Defence, Women in the Armed Forces, note 9.
pdf/canada-2007.pdf (viewed 4 July 2011). See also Davis, ‘From Ocean Ops to Combat Ops: A Short History of Women and Leadership in the Canadian Forces’, note 10, p 82. The Review was also recently advised that women comprise only 4.2% of
officers in the combat arms: Meeting with Canadian Commanders delegation.
Moelker and Bolsch, note 11, p 27. Of interest, the Review notes advice that women pilots in the US Navy and Air Force were
preferring to fly large planes, rather than fighter jets, in part because of an unwelcoming culture in the fighter jet arena, but also
because the large aircraft operated out of only two bases, meaning that personnel were more likely to establish stable family
lives in one of two locations: Meeting with Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity, Office of Secretary of Defense, USA.
Evertson and Nesbitt, note 3, p 61.
UK Ministry of Defence, Women in the Armed Forces, note 9. In a slightly different take on occupational segregation, the Review
was advised that, in Norway, women are not particularly attracted to defence roles and potential candidates head instead to
the police force (approximately 40% of the Norwegian police force are women): ‘Request for information, Australian Defence
Staff: Recruitment and retention of women in the Norwegian armed forces (NAF) – evaluations and reports’, Response from the
Norwegian Ministry of Defence, provided to the Review by CMDR A Westwood, 4 March 2012.


18 Norway was the first to remove all restrictions in 1985, while Canada followed in 1989, though keeping the restriction on women serving in submarines until 2001, when the purchase of four Victoria Class submarines allowed for greater privacy in accommodation. New Zealand has removed all restrictions, while the Netherlands retains restrictions on submarine and Marine Corps duty, citing ‘practical considerations’. Moelker and Bolsch, note 11, p 24. It should be noted that the UK and US have both recently lifted the bar on women serving in submarines, though confining their assignment to larger vessels and, in the US, to a limit of 3 women on any crew to 155 men. This has been criticised in the US context as ‘dual-track’ career progression, and perpetuating the isolation of women. See Alliance for National Defence, The Submarine assignment policy for women, Issue Paper. At http://www.4militarywomen.org/Submarines.htm (viewed 25 June 2012).


22 In the Israeli context, Rimalt notes that exclusion from combat roles excludes women not only from leadership in the military but also leadership in politics and industry: N Rimalt, ‘Women in the Sphere of Masculinity: The Double-Edged Sword of Women’s Integration in the Military’ (2007) 14 Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy 1097, p 1104.

23 UK Ministry of Defence, Equality and Diversity Annual Report 2008-2009, p 5. At http://mod.uk/DefenceInternet/Templates/InformationProfile.aspx?NRMODE=Published&NROUTILITY=%7B1992AB7E-5091-48A2-87BD-4F4D5E5FC4E0%7D&NROURL=%2FDPeace%2FAboutDefence%2FCorporatePublications%2FPersonnelPublications%2FEqualityandDiversity%2FDiversityInformation%2FEqualityDiversityScheme.htm&NRCACHEHINT=Guest (viewed 26 June 2011), notes that: ‘Promotion has tended to depend on operational experience or experience in the Combat Arms. As women are now...deploying on operations, it is expected that they will reach the higher ranks with time’.


25 Service Women’s Action Network, note 8, p 2.


29 Service Women’s Action Network, note 8, p 1.

30 Meeting with Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, USA.

31 Service Women’s Action Network, note 8, pp 3-4.


34 For general discussion see DACOWITS, Annual Report (2010), note 19; Military Leadership Diversity Commission, From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st Century Military, Final Report (2011). At http://mldc.whs.mil/index.php/final-report (viewed 2 February 2012). Meanwhile, anecdotal observations about women’s participation in front line units include women’s tendency to gravitate towards community building activities and humanitarian projects in their spare time – in turn, involving their male colleagues and improving morale, as well as relationships with the local community. MAJ J Speiser-Blanchet ‘There’s No Hell Like Tac Hell’ in Davis (ed), Women and Leadership in the Canadian Forces, note 10, p 55.


36 Shane, above.

37 Shane, above.

38 Of interest, the Review was advised that US legislative provisions which still formally require men to register for the draft may be affected if all combat roles were opened to women: Meeting with Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, USA.


41 Moelker and Bolsch, note 11, p 25.
At this point 11.8% of Colonels were women and 12.7% of LTCols were women; 13.6% of Majors, 18.1% of Captains, 21.5% of 1st Lieutenants and 20.1% of 2nd Lieutenants: Doll, note 17.


45 Canadian Forces, National Report to the Committee for Women in NATO Forces, note 5, p 2.

46 For example, MAJ Anne Reifenstein of the CF notes the palpable contrast of being a woman entering a male only unit, with entering a unit led by a woman in MAJ A Reifenstein, ‘Gender Integration – An Asymmetric Environment’ in Davis (ed), Women and Leadership in the Canadian Forces, note 10, p 7.

47 Reifenstein, note 46, p 4.

48 LTCOM Marta Muilkins, ‘Command at Sea: July 2003- June 2005’ in Davis (ed), Women and Leadership in the Canadian Forces, note 10, p 41. Another study notes that a small number of women in visible command positions can generate complacency: Evertson and Nesbitt, note 3, p 86.

49 Patten and Parker, note 12, p 7.

50 Evertson and Nesbitt, note 3, p 44.

51 Evertson and Nesbitt, note 3, p 43.


53 Moelker and Bolsch, note 11, p 8.

54 Evertson and Nesbitt, note 3, p 44.

55 Marriages of female troops are, in fact, failing at three times the rate of their male counterparts. Patten and Parker, note 12, p 6. Meanwhile, NZDF personnel express the slightly different concern that, because of the relatively small size of the force, personnel are stretched thin, with the same people rotated on multiple missions: National Equal Opportunities Network, National Conversation About Work – New Zealand Army, pp 4-5. At http://live.isitesoftware.co.nz/neon/documents/Final_NZ_Army.pdf (viewed 4 August 2011).

56 Meeting with Navy Personnel Office of Diversity and Inclusion USA.

57 Mulhall, note 43, p 4.

58 Meeting with Navy Personnel, Office of Diversity and Inclusion, USA; Meeting with ADM M Ferguson, Vice Chief of Naval Operations USA.


60 Doll, note 17, 2.3.

61 See, generally, Kelley, note 59.

62 As was the case in the mid-1990s when the First Regiment of the Canadian Airborne was disbanded after engaging, amongst other things, in quite sadistic initiation rites steeped in misogyny and homophobia: D Winslow, ‘Rites of Passage and Group Bonding in the Canadian Airborne’ (1999) 25(3) Armed Forces & Society 429.


64 See, for example, Mulhall, note 43.

65 Meeting with Veterans Affairs, USA.


67 Department of Veterans Affairs, Women Veterans Task Force, above, pp 5-6.

68 See, for example, Mulhall, note 43.

69 Meeting with Veterans Affairs, USA.

70 Department of Veterans Affairs, Women Veterans Task Force, note 66, p 2. It should be noted here that women are less likely to enrol as veterans, meaning that there is further potential for the demographic to grow: Meeting with Veterans Affairs, USA.

72 Meeting with Veterans Affairs, USA.
74 Meeting with Army Surgeon General Women’s Health Task Force, USA.
78 Meeting with Veterans Affairs, USA.
79 Meeting with Veterans Affairs, USA.
81 A Netherlands Service wide inquiry found ‘bullying’ to be more of a problem in the Dutch Services than sexual harassment, but it is possible that this is because the small proportion of women in the Dutch forces did not represent a sufficient proportion of respondents. CMDR M Meijer and L/CMDR R De Vries, ‘Sexual Harassment in Netherlands Naval Operations’, NATO, RTO-MP-HFM-158 (undated), p 29-1. At http://ftp.rta.nato.int/public/PubFullText/RTO/MP/RTO-MP-HFM-158//MP-MP-HFM-158-29.doc (viewed 6 June 2011).
83 SAPRO reports a 105% increase in reporting in the last 6 years. Briefing to DACOWITS, Dr S Holroyd, SAPRO, June 2011: DACOWITS, Annual Report (2011), note 21, p 4.
86 DACOWITS, Annual Report (2011), note 21, p ii. In addition, the Committee noted as ongoing concerns that DOD and the Services should consider placing greater attention on prevention of sexual harassment as distinct from sexual assault; that additional specialized training should be required for investigators, counsellors and victim advocates in sexual assault matters; and that investigation should occur into whether there are special problems of sexual assault and sexual harassment in the recruiting process and, if so, how they should be addressed.
87 Commentators note the disparity between the ambition of successive Norwegian governments to increase the representation of women within the armed forces, and the reality. They suggest that this is, in part, because Scandinavian and Northern European cultures are less militarised, with defence careers consequently attracting less prestige. See Moelker and Bolsch, note 11; A Schjoslet, NATO and the Women: Exploring the Gender Gap in the Armed Forces, Peace Research Institute Oslo (2010). At www.prio.no/Research-and-Publications/Publication/?oid=192310 (viewed 19 November 2011).
88 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Handbook on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Armed Personnel (2008), p 122. At www.osce.org/odihr/31393 (viewed 21 January 2012). Meanwhile, the brief provided to the Review notes that a range of research projects are underway under the auspices of the Norwegian Defence Department to investigate Norway’s progress on gender integration. ‘Request for information, Australian Defence Staff: Recruitment and retention of women in the Norwegian armed forces (NAF) – evaluations and reports’, Response from the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, p 1, provided to the Review by CMDR A Westwood, 4 March 2012.
89 Schjoslet, note 87, p 35.
92 See Bourgon, note 1, p 24. The Review was advised that the US Navy experiences a particular drag to the nuclear industry and pays retention bonuses of about $20,000 – $30,000 a year to specific occupations as a result: Meeting with ADM M Ferguson, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, USA.
93 Meeting with ADM M Ferguson, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, USA.
94 Meeting with ADM M Ferguson, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, USA.
95 Meeting with ADM Mark Ferguson, Vice Chief of Naval Operations USA. The Review was advised that the US Navy has a goal of being a Service that ‘looks like America’ by the year 2040.
96 For example, the US Vice Chief of Naval Operations cites IBM as a model. By moving to a mobile workforce, IBM has dramatically increased its number of senior female employees: Meeting with ADM M Ferguson, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, USA.
See, for example, New Zealand Defence Force, *From Equity to Diversity*, www.nzdf.mil.nz/personnel-records/personnel-branch/from-equity-to-diversity.htm (viewed 27 March 2012). Interestingly, one US study notes that the female members of the current active-duty US forces are more racially diverse than their male counterparts, making a broader understanding of ‘diversity’ even more relevant to these particular Service personnel: Patten and Parker, note 12.

Meeting with Canadian Commanders delegation.


Meeting with Canadian Commanders delegation.

Emphases vary across the forces, from the UK’s focus on ‘diversity, not political correctness’ from the UK Armed Forces – see UK Chief of the General Staff’s *Equality and Diversity Directive for the Army*, Army Code 64340, April 2008, p 1. At http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/CGS_ED_Directive-Apr_08.pdf (viewed 3 July 2011), in contrast to the overt reference to ‘gender’ in the Scandinavian and Dutch environments. See, for example, Meijer and De Vries, note 81, p 29-2.

Certainly, CWINF recommendations recognise this, calling for annual evaluation of measures and indicators, the appointment of a gender advisor in all operations and the generation of checklists for how gender is incorporated in operational planning and operations. The Committee also calls for the provision of equipment and clothing that fit women’s bodies and needs; and separate sanitary facilities and accommodations for women and men. Committee for Women in NATO Forces, *Improving the Gender Balance: A Selected List of Best Practices*, CWINF 2008. At www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/2008-11-gender_balance.pdf (viewed 30 March 2012).

Reiffenstein, note 46, p 4. Major Anne Reiffenstein notes the very basic challenge of walking into a unit as the only woman and finding no women’s bathroom. See also MAJ S Forbes ‘Building Trust and Credibility at Home and Abroad’ in Davis (ed), *Women and Leadership in the Canadian Forces*, note 10, p 28.

Much of the international literature scanned explored explored performance and perceptions of leadership qualities in female cadets, with female cadets often coming out ahead of male cadets in performance indicators, particularly in respect of personality ‘hardiness’ and self-assurance, as well as academic performance. Despite this, perceptions of female and male leaders differed, with junior male officers assumed to be just as qualified as senior male officers, but junior female officers perceived to be underqualified. S Gibson, ‘Perceptions of US Military Leadership: Are All Leaders Created Equally?’ (2005) 24 (2) Equal Opportunities International 1. See also Kelley, note 59; Morgan, note 59; Bartone, et al, note 59; Watkins and Bourg, note 59.

Committee for Women in NATO Forces, note 103.

Military Leadership Diversity Commission, note 34, p 11.

Moelker and Bolsch, note 11, p 24. Also note that a significantly larger percentage of female personnel are on short-term contracts.

Patten and Parker, note 12.

Bourgon, note 1, p 19.


Meeting with Canadian Commanders delegation.